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Abstract
Internal mobility is a critical component of economic growth and development, as it enables the reallocation of labor to more productive opportunities
across sectors and regions. Using detailed district-to-district migration data
from the 2001 Census of India, the paper highlights the role of state borders as
significant impediments to internal mobility. The analysis finds that average
migration between neighboring districts in the same state is at least 50 percent
larger than neighboring districts on different sides of a state border, even after accounting for linguistic differences. Although the impact of state borders
differs by education, age, and reason for migration, it is always large and significant. The paper suggests that inter-state mobility is inhibited by state-level
entitlement schemes, ranging from access to subsidized goods through the public distribution system to the bias for states’ own residents in access to tertiary
education and public sector employment.
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Introduction

Development and economic growth take place through the more efficient allocation
of inputs among alternative productive uses. Labor is a key input since it is the
main asset of the majority of the population, especially of the poor, in developing
countries. The reallocation of labor can take place across sectors, occupations and,
most importantly, geographic regions. Thus, it is no surprise that every successful development experience and growth episode is accompanied by large labor movements,
especially from rural to urban areas, and from low to higher productivity sectors and
occupations. In this regard, India presents a paradox and daunting challenge.
As of 2001, internal migrants represented 30 percent of India’s population, but
this number is deceptively large. A closer inspection of the data reveals that twothirds are intra-district migrants, more than half of whom are women migrating for
marriage. Comparing India’s migration rates with those of Brazil, China and the US
reveals that they are relatively low. As seen in the last column of Table 1, India has
the lowest cross-district migration rate at 2.8 percent while the rate is over 9 percent
in Brazil, almost 10 percent in China and 20 percent in the U.S. Internal migrants in
India are less likely to move across major administrative units (states or provinces)
compared to those in the other three countries. Inter-state migration is slightly above
1 percent in India, while it is 3.6 percent in Brazil, 4.7 percent in China and almost 10
percent in the U.S.1 In fact, a cross national comparison of internal migration rates
over a five year interval between the years 2000 and 2010, (Bell, Charles-Edwards,
Ueffing, Stillwell, Kupiszewski, and Kupiszewska 2015) shows that India ranks last
in a sample of 80 countries.2
This paper makes several contributions in exploring internal migration patterns
1

These data are broadly consistent with another study of the U.S. which finds that those who
moved from one state to another within a given five-year period accounted for 12 percent of the
population in 2005 (Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak 2011).
2
Government of India (2017), using provisional tables from the 2011 census, suggests that the
share of migrants for economic reasons rose from 8.1 percent of the workforce in 2001 to 10.5 percent
in 2011. Given the large differences in migration rates between India and other countries shown in
Table 1, growth of this magnitude would not change the characterization of India as a country with
relatively low internal migration.
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and their determinants in India. The first is the presentation of internal migration
patterns in India in greater detail by using district-to-district census-based migration
data, disaggregated by age, education, duration of stay and reason for migration.
Most existing studies in India use household survey data that suffer from sampling
and aggregation biases and are rarely bilateral. Our data allow us to control for origin and destination specific factors (such as natural endowments, economic and social
conditions, and climate) through fixed effects in a gravity model. Thus, we are able
to focus on the bilateral variables emphasized in the literature. Among these are the
critical contiguity variables – being in the same state and/or being neighbors – in
addition to the standard physical distance and linguistic overlap measures. Furthermore, by using bilateral migration data between 585 districts, instead of the standard
state-to-state analysis in other papers, we are able to solve many of the aggregation
problems that arise in large countries like India. For example, Uttar Pradesh would
rank as the fifth most populous country in the world if it were independent, and
treating it as a single observation creates many biases.
The second and more substantive contribution is to demonstrate the role played
by administrative barriers, particularly state borders, in limiting internal migration in
India. Our empirical analysis shows that, even when we control for numerous barriers
to internal mobility, such as physical distance, linguistic differences and economic
and social features of origin and destination districts (through district fixed effects),
state borders continue to be important impediments. Migration between neighboring
districts in the same state is at least 50 percent larger than migration between districts
which are on different sides of a state border. This gap varies by education level, age
and reason for migration, yet it is always large and significant.
The low level of internal mobility in India – including the role of state borders –
cannot be attributed to restrictions imposed by the state or federal governments. In
China, for example, federal government policies have constrained migration through
measures such as the hukou system. No such administrative measures exist in India,
and anyone is legally free to move from one district or one state to another. Moreover,
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federal laws in India protect migrant workers from exploitation in destination regions.
One such provision is the Inter State Migrant Workmen Act, 1979, which requires that
migrants are paid timely wages equal to or higher than the minimum wage.3
We provide preliminary evidence that mobility is India is inhibited by explicit
and implicit entitlement programs implemented at the state level. First, many social
benefits are not portable across state boundaries. For example, access to subsidized
food through the Public Distribution System (PDS), with a coverage of over half of
the population (Government of India 2016), and even admission to public hospitals
is administered on the basis of “ration cards”, issued and accepted only by the home
state government. While non-portability of such benefits inhibits the movement of
the poor and the unskilled, two other factors contribute to the inertia of the skilled.
Many universities and technical institutes are under the control of state governments,
and state residents get preferential admission. Furthermore, government jobs account
for more than half of the employment opportunities for individuals with secondary
education and above. State domicile is required for employment in such government
entities. We show patterns that suggest these state-level policies inhibit inter-state
mobility for both low and high-skilled people. Specifically, the relative share of unskilled migrants moving out-of-state is lower precisely in the states with higher levels
of participation in the public distributions system. The relative share of skilled migrants moving out-of-state is lower in states with higher rates of public employment.
And the relative share of migrants moving out-of-state to seek education is lower in
states with higher rates of access to tertiary education.
The limited labor mobility in India has been documented since the early 1960s
(Srivastava and McGee 1998; Singh 1998; Lusome and Bhagat 2006 and Srivastava
and Sasikumar 2003). In spite of these observations, there have been few attempts
to empirically investigate the causes (Rajan and Mishra 2012). Most studies on the
topic have been concerned with identifying patterns of migration and the general
3

Menon (2012) questions the effectiveness and implementation of this provision. Other legal
provisions that migrants can benefit from are the Minimum Wage Act, 1948; the Contract Labour
Act, 1970; the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976; and the Building and Other Construction Workers’
Act, 1996 (Srivastava and Sasikumar 2003).
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characteristics of migrants (Singh 1998; Lusome and Bhagat 2006; Hnatkovska and
Lahiri 2015). A more recent study (Pandey 2014) documents a slight upward trend
in the overall level of migration from the early 1990s, primarily driven by increased
intra-district and intra-state movements.4
Studies by Bhattacharyya (1985), Munshi and Rosenzweig (2016) and Viswanathan
and Kumar (2015) are exceptions that move beyond descriptive analyses. While the
last paper examines how migration responds to environmental changes, the first two
papers provide an explanation for the low levels of rural to urban migration in India.
Bhattacharyya (1985) presents a theoretical framework for developing countries, in
which migration decisions are more likely to be taken at the (extended) family level as
opposed to the individual level, with the objective of increasing overall family income.
Closely related, Munshi and Rosenzweig (2016) explore the linkages between the caste
networks in rural areas and migration incentives. They argue that emigration of an
income-earning individual reduces the family’s access to the caste network as a social
safety net. This reduces the incentives for internal migration considerably. While
this explanation addresses low rural to urban migration, where community networks
exert a strong influence on the decisions of members, it does not explain why urban
to urban migration is also low or why we observe differences in migration patterns
across state borders.
Mobility across certain administrative boundaries can be costly, especially if these
boundaries reflect differences in societal characteristics such as language, culture, laws
and institutions or geographic barriers (Belot and Ederveen 2012). The first study to
point out such a cost was by McCallum (1995) using trade as an example. McCallum
showed that Canadian provinces adjacent to the United States trade more with their
neighboring provinces than with the states in the U.S.5 Subsequent studies have
confirmed McCallum’s findings and unearthed evidence of a border cost in the case of
4

Government of India (2017) also finds an upward trend in migration using estimates based not
on actual migration but on railway passenger data and changes in the population within state and
district level age cohorts.
5
There is now an extensive literature on the role of national borders in trade, as reviewed in
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003; 2004).
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migration (Helliwell 1997; and Poncet 2006). Helliwell (1997), for example, suggests
that inter-provincial migration in Canadian provinces is almost 100 times more likely
than migration to Canadian provinces from the United States. But these studies
explore the role of international borders rather than the internal ones.
Migration costs naturally impede internal migration flows in a country. Bayer
and Juessen (2012) suggest that inter-state migration in the U.S. can cost a potential
migrant up to two-thirds of an average household annual income. In her study of
internal migration in China, Poncet (2006) suggests migration flows between two
localities are negatively related to distance but positively related to contiguity (as
well as with wage levels at the destination). More relevant to our paper, they too find
that there is more intra-province migration in comparison to inter-province migration.
The next section of the paper presents the internal migration data, the geographic
and linguistic distance variables as well as several empirical observations that motivate
the analysis. Section 3 introduces the gravity model and our empirical specification,
followed by empirical results in Section 4. We then discuss the results in Section 5
and end with the conclusions.

2

Data

2.1

Data source and empirical observations

The National Census of India for 2001 is the main data source in this paper.6 The
census has been conducted every decade since 1871 and is the responsibility of the
Office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner in the Ministry of Home Affairs. The national census, like those in many other countries, collects individual and
household level information on various demographic and labor market characteristics
for the entire population. We supplement the census with additional household and
labor force data from the 55th Round (1999-2000) and the 61st Round (2004-2005)
6

As of the date of drafting of this paper, the migration related sections of the 2011 Census have
not been processed.
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of the National Sample Survey (NSS), which cover over 100 thousand households.
In addition to standard household modules on consumption, health, education and
employment, it includes specialized surveys that rotate each year. The NSS has
a significantly larger set of questions and therefore provides more detailed data in
comparison to the Census, but for a much smaller sample of the population.
The census asks two different questions pertaining to the migration status of the
respondents – one based on birthplace and one on place of last residence. The last
residence question is less common in censuses, but it is more relevant for economic
analysis of internal mobility (Carletto, Larrison, and Ozden 2014). We define an
individual as a migrant “if the place in which he is enumerated during the census is
other than his place of immediate last residence” (Census, 2001). The Census includes
additional questions based on the last residence criteria. These questions include
reason for migration (marriage, education, employment etc.), the urban/rural status
of the location of last residence and the duration of stay in the current residence since
migration. Such information sheds additional light on the patterns and determinants
of internal mobility.
While the census questionnaire asks these questions to each respondent, the resulting individual level data are not made publicly available. Instead, the data are
aggregated up to the geographic units – depending on the purpose – and are disseminated through tables. For example, we can find the number of people living in a given
district whose previous residence was in a different state or another district within the
same state. In some cases, the publicly available tables include additional variables on
gender, education or reason for migration. However, these datasets do not present bilateral migrant stocks at the district level, and therefore, they do not lend themselves
to empirical analysis, especially to gravity type estimation. We therefore requested
detailed bilateral (district-to-district) migration data from the Census Bureau, which
provided us with a series of tables under a special administration agreement. These
tables contained the following for all pairs of districts in India: (i) migration stocks
by gender and educational attainment levels, (ii) migration stocks by gender and age
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groups, (iii) migration stocks by gender and reason for migrating, and (iv) migration
stocks by gender and duration of stay at the destination.7
Using the compiled data, we distinguish four subgroups of the population: (i) nonmigrants, (ii) intra-district migrants, i.e. those who moved from one enumeration area
to another one within the same district, (iii) inter-district migrants within the same
state, i.e. people who moved across districts within the same state, and (iv) interstate migrants, i.e. those who moved across states. Table 2 presents the sizes of
these groups by gender. Migrants account for close to 30 percent of the population
in 2001, albeit with considerable divergence in patterns across genders. The share
of migrants among females (43.3 percent) is almost three times larger than among
males (16.3 percent). This gap is due to the well-known migration of women within
the same or neighboring districts for marriage. The share of intra-district migrants
among women is 29.5 percent, over three times the level among men. Inter-district
(but intra-state) migration among women is 9.8 percent, over twice the level among
men. Finally, inter-state migration among women is 4 percent, slightly higher than
among men.
The low level of internal migration in India, its spatial variation and gender gaps
are further illustrated by district-level heat maps of Central India in Figure 1. In each
map, state boundaries are outlined with thick lines, and districts are color-coded so
that darker-shaded districts have relatively higher shares of the relevant migration
measure.
Figures 1a and 1b plot the share of all inter-district migrants (the sum of intrastate-inter-district migrants and inter-state migrants) by gender among the existing
population in each district. Figure 1b is much “darker” in color, indicating that interdistrict migration is higher among women. In 337 districts, over ten percent of the
current female population are inter-district migrants, while only 101 districts have
7

Each table has over 350,000 rows and between 10 and 16 columns. The 2001 administrative
division of India has 593 districts, 9 of which are districts in Delhi. In our analysis, we combined
the nine districts in Delhi, and treat Delhi as one single district. This leaves us with 585 districts in
the empirical analysis.
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the same share among males. Furthermore, we observe more migration to the West
coast, especially to districts in Maharashtra, and to Northwestern states, especially
to Punjab, Haryana and Delhi.
The data allow us to compare those who stay within the same state (intra-state
migrants) with those who move to another state (inter-state migrants) as presented
in Figure 2. More specifically, Figures 2a and 2b present the share of inter-state migrants among all inter-district migrants in destination districts for males and females,
respectively. Even though the number of female migrants far exceeds that of male
migrants, female migration is mostly within the same state while male migrants are
more likely to cross state borders. That is why most districts in Figure 2a (for men)
are darker in color compared to Figure 2b (for women). On average, 43 percent of
male inter-district migrants are from another state, compared to 29 percent of female
inter-district migrants. Furthermore, districts that receive higher shares of migrants
from other states are located along state borders, an issue which we will explore in
detail in the empirical section.
The key feature of our dataset is its bilateral nature at the district level. To
highlight the role of state borders on internal migration, we take the district of Nagpur
in Maharashtra as an example. We chose Nagpur since it is geographically located
at the center of India and close to three other states – Andra Pradesh, Madhya
Pradesh and Chattisgarh. Figures 3a and ?? plot the color-coded distribution of
the origin districts of the migrants coming to Nagpur. The vast majority of these
migrants come from other districts in Maharastra or from districts in neighboring
states. In fact, four out of the top five origin districts are in Maharashtra, and six out
of the seven districts that share a border with Nagpur are among the top ten senders.
The four neighboring districts in Maharashtra (Bhandara, Wardha, Amravati, and
Chandrapur) send a total of 31 percent of Nagpur’s immigrants. The remaining three
neighboring districts in Madhya Pradesh (Balaghat, Chhindwara, and Seoni) send a
total of 13 percent. The prohibitive role of state borders becomes more clear when
we note there are more migrants from several distant districts in Maharashtra than
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from neighboring districts in other states. Similar patterns are observed when we
look at out-migration from Nagpur to other districts in Figures 3c and 3d. The most
popular destinations of Nagpur’s emigrants are neighboring districts in Maharashtra
(Bhandara, Wardha, Amravati, and Chandrapur) which receive a total of 32 percent
of emigrants from Nagpur. Neighboring districts in other states receive much fewer
migrants when compared to distant coastal districts of Maharashtra (see Figure 3d).
Table 4 presents summary statistics by gender and various other dimensions. The
first disaggregation is by age groups. The share of migrants are highest among those
between 25 and 65 years of age. The gap is especially stark for women where the
migrant ratio dramatically increases from 23.2 percent for 14-19 year olds to 69.1
percent for the 25-34 year olds, highlighting the role of marriage in migration. The
corresponding increase is less drastic among men.
The second set of rows in Table 4 illustrates patterns of migration for four education levels: (i) illiterate, (ii) primary school education, (iii) secondary school education, and (iv) tertiary education. People with higher educational levels appear
to be more mobile. This holds for both aggregate levels of migration as well as for
movements across geographical boundaries. For instance, migrants account for 35.6
percent of the tertiary educated male population compared with 11.5 percent for the
illiterate males, and inter-state migrants represent 8.4 percent among the former but
only 2.1 among the latter. The patterns are similar for females.
The reason for migration (third set of rows in Table 4) is one of the most important
questions in the census. We aggregated the answers into five main categories: (i) work
or business, (ii) marriage, (iii) move with the family, (iv) education, and (v) other
reasons. For men, work/business, move with the family and others are the main
reasons (around 30 percent each) while marriage dominates all other categories for
women (70 percent). Unfortunately, the format of the data does not allow us to
construct cross-tabulations, such as by education and reason for migration, which
would provide further insights.
Closely linked to the propensity of moving across geographical boundaries is the
10

duration of stay at the destination. The bottom set of rows in Table 4 reports
summary statistics on the origin distribution of migrants across four intervals of
duration of stay at their destinations. The data suggest that most migrants (i.e.
about 50 percent) have lived at their destination for over 10 years, although this is
driven by female migrants. Regardless of the duration of stay considered, there is
very little variation in the distribution of migrants by origin (e.g. inter-state versus
intra-state), especially among males.

2.2

Migration measures and other controls

The key dependent variables, bilateral migration stocks, are based on the Census
data described above. In addition, we construct several explanatory variables needed
for the gravity estimation. These are standard bilateral distance, linguistic overlap
and other geographic proximity variables. They are described and discussed in detail
below.
Bilateral Migration Stocks
We define mij as the stock of migrants who moved from origin (or previous) district
i to destination (or current) district j as of 2001.8 We also amalgamate intra-district
migrants with non-migrants in the empirical analysis. Lastly, we disaggregate the
migrant numbers also by education, age, reason for migration and duration in later
sections and mij represents the relevant bilateral migrant stock in each regression.
Following the approach in gravity models of international migration, we control
for dyadic factors that influence migration costs: physical distance, linguistic proximity,9 contiguity, and state borders.10 The construction of these control variables is
explained below.
State Borders and Contiguity
Borders, either physical or institutional, could impose costs on mobility. To cap8

Since we only measure the migrant stock at 2001, we do not observe return or circular migration.
We include cultural proximity variables using caste information in a robustness check.
10
We should note that origin and destination specific factors are not included since we control for
them with origin and destination fixed effects in our empirical analysis.
9
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ture the effects of state borders on mobility, we first construct a contiguity variable
which takes a value of 1 if two districts share a common land border. Empirical studies on international migration (Mayda 2010; Artuc, Docquier, Ozden, and Parsons
2015) have documented higher migration flows between countries with common border relative to noncontiguous ones and the same properties arguably hold for internal
migration. Next, we construct a dummy variable to indicate whether the origin and
destination districts are located in the same state. These two variables allow us to
categorize district-pairs into 4 distinct groups: (i) different states and not neighbors,
(ii) different states and neighbors, (iii) same state and not neighbors, and (iv) same
state and neighbors.
We note that three of the states were in fact newly created in November 2000 by
splitting existing states. Chhattisgarh was created out of eastern Madhya Pradesh;
Uttaranchal (renamed Uttarakhand in 2007) was created out of the mountainous
districts of northwest Uttar Pradesh; and Jharkhand was created out of the southern
districts of Bihar. In other words, new state borders were created within Madhya
Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, and Bihar (see Figure A1 in the Online Appendix). Since
their creation predates 2001, we treat these three new states as “different” states
throughout most of our analysis. However, as discussed in the results section, we
confirm that our analysis is robust to ignoring the state division of November 2000
and using only the boundaries of the original, undivided states.
The first column in Table 3 tabulates the number of district-pairs that fall into
each contiguity category. We have a total of 341,640 district-pairs in our dataset.
Among these, for example, 323,906 (95 percent) are in different states and they are
not neighbors while 14,576 are in the same state and not neighbors.
Distance
The physical distance between two districts is expected to influence migration through
its effect on transportation costs and the degree of uncertainty about earnings at the
prospective destination. For bilateral distance between any two districts, we calculate
geodesic distances – the length of the shortest curve between two points along the
12

surface of a mathematical model of the earth – between the districts’ geographical
centers.11 In robustness checks, we include several other distance variables. These
are (i) geodesic distances between largest cities in each district, (ii) driving distance
between these cities using the transport network and (iii) driving time between these
cities.

12

Linguistic Proximity
Another important component of bilateral migration costs is the linguistic differences
(Belot and Ederveen 2012; Adsera and Pytlikova 2015); linguistic proximity facilitates communication and skill transferability, especially for the less skilled. First, we
measure linguistic distance between any two districts (i, j) following the commonly
used ethnolinguistic fractionalization (EFL) index (Mira 1964), which measures the
probability of two randomly chosen individuals from different districts speaking the
same language. We concentrate on the mother tongue, which is “the language spoken
in childhood to the person by the person’s mother”, as reported in the 2001 Census
of India. In addition to data availability, we argue that there are two advantages in
using the mother tongue. First, each individual has a unique mother tongue even if
they are multilingual. Second, mother tongue relates more closely to an individual’s
birth place, family background, and social networks. In the 2001 Census of India,
there are 122 separate mother tongues, and all districts have multiple mother tongues
spoken by the native population.
We construct two different measures of linguistic proximity between two districts:
Common Languageij and Language Overlapij . Let sli and slj be the share of individuals speaking mother tongue l in districts i and j, respectively. Then sli ∗ slj is the
probability that an individual from i can speak to an individual from j in language l.
Summing over all possible mother tongues, Common Languageij measures the likelihood of any two individuals being able to communicate in a common language. This
11

We restrict centroids to be inside the boundaries of a polygon.
See Alder, Roberts, and Tewari (2017) for more details on how these distances and travel times
are calculated using the road network data.
12
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is given by:
Common Languageij =

∑

sli · slj

l

Similarly, Language Overlapij measures the degree of overlap in languages spoken
at any pair of districts. min{sli , slj } is the intersection of people from each district who
speak the same language l. Since each person has only one mother tongue, summing
over all possible mother tongues, we have the overlap of people from two districts
that can understand each other. This is calculated as:
Language Overlapij =

∑

min {sli , slj }

l

Our linguistic proximity measures do not take into account the genealogical relations (linguistic distance) between languages,13 and thus can be considered a lower
bound of the linguistic proximity across districts.
Table 3 summarizes the language and distance measures by contiguity of districtpairs. Overall, neighboring districts are closer to each other in terms of distance and
linguistic proximity relative to non-neighboring districts. The average district-todistrict log distance is 6.8. For neighbors, regardless of whether they are in the same
state or not, the log distance is 4.3, which is 12 times smaller. Districts that are in
the same state have greater linguistic proximity than district-pairs from two different
states. This confirms that language was an important consideration in the drawing
of state borders. Consistent with this, even though neighboring districts in different
states have higher linguistic overlap than non-neighboring districts in different states,
this overlap is lower than that among districts in the same state.
13

Several studies use language trees from Ethnologue and use number of shared nodes between two
languages to construct a linguistic proximity measure. Such studies include Adsera and Pytlikova
(2015); Belot and Hatton (2012); Desmet, Weber, and Ortuño-Ortín (2009) and Desmet, OrtunoOrtin, and Wacziarg (2012).
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3

Empirical specification

In the empirical analysis to follow, we adopt a gravity specification, which is based on
a random utility maximization model. This specification has been extensively used
in the analysis of migration patterns.14 Our specification is given by:
dif f −N BR
same−N BR
same−notN BR
mij = α+β1 ·lnDISTij +β2 ·LAN Gij +γ1 ·Dij
+γ2 ·Dij
+γ3 ·Dij
+δi +δj +ϵij

(1)
The dependent variable, mij , measures migration from origin i to destination j. In
our case, it is the size of the inter-district migration stock. The bilateral independent
variables introduced previously are: lnDISTij , log geodesic distance between districts
i and j; LAN Gij , linguistic proximity between districts i and j. There are three
dif f −N BR
contiguity variables: Dij
is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if
same−N BR
districts i and j are in different states but are neighbors; Dij
is dummy

variable that is equal to 1 if the districts i and j are in the same state and are
same−notN BR
neighbors; Dij
is dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the districts i and j

are in the same state but are not neighbors. The base group is “not in the same state
and not neighbors”. The difference between γ2 and γ1 gauges the role of the state
borders.
Multilateral resistance, in the context of bilateral migration decisions, is the influence exerted by the attractiveness of other destinations (Bertoli and Moraga 2013),
and can introduce bias in the estimation if not properly addressed. We include origin
and destination fixed effects, δi and δj , to account for the multilateral resistance as
well as for unobserved heterogeneity in sending and receiving districts in our crosssectional data.
We estimate the above specified gravity model using Poisson Pseudo-Maximum
Likelihood, or PPML (Silva and Tenreyro 2006). As thoroughly discussed by Beine,
Bertoli, and Fernandez-Huertas Moraga (2015), PPML is a more reliable estimator
14
Beine, Bertoli, and Fernandez-Huertas Moraga (2015); Beine, Docquier, and Ozden (2011);
Beine and Parsons (2015); Bertoli and Moraga (2013); Grogger and Hanson (2011); Mayda (2010).
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since, (1) OLS estimates are biased and inconsistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity of ϵij , and (2) PPML performs well in the presence of a large share of zeros,
which is slightly over 40 percent of observations in our data.

4

Empirical results

4.1

Main results

Our first set of results explores the determinants of bilateral migration patterns, and
more specifically the role of district and state borders. As discussed earlier, the
dependent variable is the stock of migrants currently living in district j and whose
previous residence was in district i. Since we have fixed effects for both origin and
destination districts, we include only bilateral variables in the estimation – distance,
language overlap and dummy variables for the contiguity relationships. Each pair of
districts can have one of the four possible relationships: (i) different states and not
neighbors, (ii) different states and neighbors, (iii) same state and not neighbors, (iv)
same state and neighbors. In the estimations that follow, “different states and not
neighbors” is the base category, and hence dropped from the regression.
Table 5 presents our main gravity estimates. The first set of three columns relates
to total migration, the next set of three columns pertains to men, and the last set
of three columns to women. The first and second columns in each set have different
linguistic proximity variables. The third column presents the results when the newly
split states are included as a separate group.
The distance variable has a negative coefficient in all specifications, as expected,
and all the estimates are quantitatively close to each other. The language variables
all have a positive sign, again as expected, with higher coefficients for men, indicating
linguistic proximity is a more important pull factor for them. The most important
variables are the contiguity dummy variables. We see that relative to the base category of “different states and not neighbors”, being in the same state and being
neighbors both increase migration. For example, being in the same state but not
16

neighbors increases migration (in Column 1) by almost twice (e1.097 − 1). The impact
of being in the same state is higher for men than women. Being in different states but
neighbors also has a large positive effect. In column 1, we see that total migration is
around 4.5 times (e1.730 − 1) larger in this case and this effect is stronger for women.
The most important observation is that the coefficient for same-state-neighbor
dummy variable is larger than the different-state-neighbor coefficient in every column. This difference is statistically significant. For example, in the first column,
being neighbors and in the same state increases total migration by almost eight times
(e2.177 − 1), indicating that the state borders have a large negative effect on internal
migration in India. To put it differently, migration between neighboring districts in
the same state is around at least 50 percent larger than migration between neighboring districts in different states (e2.177−1.730 − 1). The state border effect is almost
identical for men and women when we compare the differences between the relevant
coefficients in columns 4 and 7.
As noted earlier, we treat the recently created states of Chattisgarh, Uttaranchal
and Jharkhand as “different states” in most of our analysis. To confirm that our
analysis is robust to this event, in the third column of each set, we create a separate
state border category called “split states” to indicate two districts that were in the
same state before 2000, but now belong to different states post 2000 due to the state
split. For example, Godda and Banka used to be in the Bihar before 2000. After Bihar
was split, Godda went to Jharkhand while Banka remained in Bihar. Thus Godda
and Banka are coded as districts from “split states”. We see that the coefficient for the
“split states and neighbors” dummy is never statistically different from the coefficient
for the “same state and neighbors” dummy (columns 3, 6 and 9). This is consistent
with the fact that the migration observed in the 2001 census largely predates the
creation of the new states. If the state borders represented natural mobility barriers,
the coefficient of the “split states and neighbors” dummy would have been closer to the
“different states and neighbors” dummy rather than the “same state and neighbor”
dummy. More convincing evidence will come from the 2011 census, when we will
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be able to see what happens to migration flows after the new state boundaries were
imposed.15
The next set of tables presents the results of the gravity estimation for different
sub-groups of migrants, by age, education, reason for migration and duration of migration. Estimates when the sample only comprises males are reported on the left,
and those for females are on the right. We only use the share of common language
variable since the choice of the linguistic overlap variable does not seem to affect the
results.
In Table 6, we explore the impact of the distance and contiguity variables on
different age groups. The signs on distance and language variables are as expected,
and similar for all age groups. Being in the same state and being neighbors increase
migration, with the same state effect being higher for men and the neighbor effect
being higher for women. Most importantly, there does not seem to be much difference
across age groups. The state border effect – the difference between the “different states
and neighbors” and “same state and neighbors” coefficients – are slightly higher for
younger men of working age and younger women in the marrying age group, relative
to older people (above age 65).
The next disaggregation is by education level, as presented in Table 7. In this case,
as education levels increase, distance becomes less of an impediment while linguistic
proximity becomes more important. Furthermore, the changes in these coefficients
are larger for women relative to men. With respect to the contiguity variables, we
observe interesting patterns. Being in the same state is significantly more important
for more educated people while being neighbors is less important for them. As a
result, the state border effect between neighboring districts is rapidly increasing in
education levels. For example, for illiterate men, the state border effect is only 17
percent (e1.482−1.325 − 1) as seen in Column 1. On the other hand, for college educated
15

In all specifications except for Table 5, we group “Split States” with “Different States” because
at least some migration in our dataset took place after the split, and their inclusion in the “Different
States” category mitigates the risk of creating a bias in favor of finding a significant border effect.
Tables in the Online Appendix show that our results are robust to how we treat district pairs from
split states.
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men, being in the same state increases migration between neighboring districts by
about 149 percent (e1.852−0.939 − 1) as seen in column 4.
Table 8 splits the population by reason for migration, revealing large differences
between men and women. As mentioned earlier, women migrate predominantly for
marriage reasons to nearby districts while men migrate for employment reasons to
more distant areas. As a result, distance is a large impediment for women migrating
for marriage (column 5) relative to other reasons. The importance of distance for
women migrating for marriage appears again in the neighborhood coefficients, which
are significantly higher for this group. For men migrating for work, common language
and being neighbors seem to be less important (column 2). The negative state border
effect for males is significant for migration motivated by movement with the family,
work and education, but not marriage.

4.2

Robustness checks

The labor mobility between two districts could depend on the relative level of attributes such as income levels, extent of urbanization or literacy rates, in addition to
distance, contiguity and linguistic overlap. To account for this possibility, we include
several relative “attraction” metrics as controls. Using 2001 census tables and 2004
National Sample Survey (NSS) data, we calculate the following variables at the district level: (i) the percentage of non ST/SC population,16 (ii) the literacy rate, (iii)
the urbanization rate, (iv) the share of private employment in the labor force, (v)
the share of formal employment in the labor force, and (vi) average income. Districts
with higher values of these metrics are likely to attract more migrants from districts
with lower values. The attraction between an origin district i and destination district
j due to an attribute a is then measured by saij =

aj
ai

. Since these bilateral variables

are correlated across district-pairs, we do not insert them separately into the regression. Instead, we calculate the overall “attraction index” between i and j which is a
16

“ST/SC” refers to “scheduled tribes and scheduled castes.”
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simple average of the six attributes: sij =

1
6

∑
a

saij .17

Table 9 presents the PPML regression results when the bilateral attraction variable
sij is included in the gravity regression. Column 1 has the original results and column
2 includes the attraction index. Comparing columns (1) and (2), the coefficients of
distance and contiguity variables barely change and are robust to the inclusion of the
attraction variable. More importantly, the state border effect remains strong. The
attraction index is significant, suggesting that the listed pull factors lead to higher
migration flows.
Column 3 presents the results when we interact the attraction index with each
one of the contiguity variables. We first note that the gap between ‘same state
neighbor’ and ‘different state neighbor’ dummies disappears and they are no longer
statistically different, indicating that the state border effect is zero when sij = 0 and
the destination is not attractive at all relative to the origin. The coefficient of the
interaction term between sij and the ‘different state neighbor’ is greater than the
coefficient of the interaction term with the ‘same state neighbor’ dummy. In other
words, the state border effect becomes stronger as the bilateral attractiveness of the
destination district increases.
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Our next extension introduces other measures of distance which are highly relevant
in the context of low-income countries with poor infrastructure. The analysis above
relied on the flight distance between the geographic centers of origin and destination
districts as a measure of distance and traveling cost. This measure may suffer from two
measurement errors. First, flight distance does not account for the transport network
across India, and thus distorts the actual cost of travel. For two districts that are not
connected by highways, the flight distance underestimates the relative traveling time.
If this measurement error is more relevant among district pairs that are in different
states, the gravity estimation could overstate the state border effect. Second, the
17

See Table A5 in the Online Appendix for the summary statistics of district characteristics
included in the attraction index.
18
Specifically, the state border effect is given by (2.420 − 2.345) + [−0.286 − (−0.576)] · sij , and
therefore increasing in sij .

20

geographic centers are not necessarily the economic or population centers that send
and receive most migrants. Thus distance measures using geographic centers might
not accurately reflect traveling cost between the more relevant economic centers.
Table 10 replicates the original results from Table 5 and confirms that the earlier
results are robust to alternative measures of distance. ‘l.distij , geo. centroids’ is the
geodesic (flight) distance between the geographic centers of districts i and j – it is the
same distance measure used in the previous tables. Columns (1), (5), and (9) repeat
the results from Table 5 for ease of comparison. We use three additional measures of
distance: (i) ‘l.distij in columns (2), (6), and (10) is the flight distance between the
economic centers of districts i and j, (ii) ‘l.T ravelT imeij ’ in columns (4), (8), and (12
) takes into account India’s transport network of national highways and measures the
driving time on the shortest path between the economic centers of i and j,19 and (iii)
‘l.T ravelT imeij , flat’ in columns (3), (7), and (11) assumes the same driving speed
on and off the roads – this measure is similar to the flight distance between economic
centers. The coefficients of all of these distance variables are negative. Furthermore
in each case, the state border effect remains significant.

5

Discussion: Some explanations for the invisible
wall at the border

Why do state borders inhibit migration? In this section, we highlight a number of
policies implemented at the state level which act as inhibitors, either explicitly or
implicitly, of mobility across state boundaries. Three key inhibitors of inter-state
migration will be discussed: inadequate portability of social welfare benefits and a
significant home bias in access to education and public employment.
19

See Alder, Roberts, and Tewari (2017) for more details on the method of computing these
shortest paths.
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5.1

Inadequate portability of social welfare benefits

Social welfare entitlements in India, like any country, require proper identification
of the recipients. When the recently launched “Unique Identity Documentation”
project reaches completion, India will possess a unified system of national identity
documentation. Until then, the de facto identity document for most Indian households
is the “ration card” issued by state governments. The basic purpose of this card is
to enable access to the “Public Distribution System” (PDS), a program of subsidized
food for poor households, but because there is no national identity documentation
system and the PDS covers the majority of the population, it also serves as the
proof of identity and address when requesting public services such as hospital care
and education. It is also needed for purposes such as initiating telephone service or
opening a bank account (Zelazny 2012; Abbas and Varma 2014).
Ration cards are not portable across states; that is, they are accepted only by the
issuing state. This has to do with the design of the PDS system for which these cards
were designed. Even though most of the PDS subsidy cost is borne by the central
government, the program is administered by state governments on the basis of their
own poverty lines and lists of poor households. Further, some states add subsidies of
their own to the central subsidy amount, or have a more inclusive subsidy entitlement
policy than the central government. In Tamil Nadu, for example, every person is
entitled to receive subsidized food. In Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, more than
70 percent of the population is entitled to subsidized ration. The differences in cost
are borne by the state government. As a result, state governments generally do not
extend PDS benefits to migrants who hold ration cards from other states (Srivastava
2012).
In order to get access to subsidized food and other public services in their destination state, inter-state migrants need to surrender the ration card issued by their
origin state, and obtain a new ration card from their destination state. However this
process is fraught with difficulties, particularly for poor and less educated people who
are not familiar with the bureaucratic processes and lack social or political connec22

tions in the destination state. Procedures for issuing documentation for the PDS are
complicated and vary by state. They are also prone to corruption and administrative
errors. For example, issuing officials in the destination state may refuse to accept
prior identity documentation provided by poor migrants because they are looking for
bribes (Government of India 2008; Abbas and Varma 2014).
Individuals moving across state boundaries risk losing access to the PDS, and a
host of other public services linked to the PDS for a substantial period until their
destination state issues them a new ration card. The loss of access to subsidized PDS
food could be a significant issue for most households. According to household survey
data, 27 percent of all rural households and 15 percent of all urban households were
fully dependent on PDS grain, and most households in the country were eligible in
2004-05 (Kumar, Parappurathu, Babu, and Betne 2014). Despite widespread leakage
to non-eligible households, the PDS subsidy is a particularly important source of
calories for poor households. One study estimates that in 2004-05, access to PDS
lowered the rate of nutritional deficiency in households officially categorized as “Below
Poverty Line” (BPL) from 49 percent to 37 percent (Kumar, Parappurathu, Babu,
and Betne 2014). Using survey data from 2009, another study estimates that the
PDS reduced the poverty-gap index of rural poverty in Indian states by 18 to 22
percent (Dreze 2013). Therefore, the low inter-state portability of PDS cards and a
host of other associated welfare benefits could act as an indirect barrier to migration
in India.
A survey of seasonal migrant workers in the construction industry in Delhi suggests
that the lack of identity documents also makes it difficult for low-skilled interstate
migrants to claim the benefits that they are entitled to under labor laws (Srivastava
and Sutradhar 2016). For example, the migrant workers surveyed were not registered
under the Building and Construction Workers’ Welfare Act, a law that regulates social
welfare, health care, and safety for construction workers. Lacking formal protection,
the workers had to work long hours under poor health and safety conditions. Thus,
poor inter-state portability of identity documentation leads to asymmetric enforce-
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ment of labor regulation across inter-state migrants, further reducing incentives to
move even if wage gains are substantial.
Recognizing these issues, the central government passed a law, called the 1979
Inter State Migrant Workmen Act, specifically to regulate practices associated with
the recruitment and employment of interstate migrant workers. The law requires
middlemen who recruit interstate migrant workers and the firms that hire them to
get a special license. It requires that migrant workers be paid in accordance with local
minimum wage laws, be issued a passbook recording their identity, nature of work
and remuneration, and be provided with accommodation and health care. However,
as pointed out in Section 2, studies suggest that this law is not enforced: most firms
hiring migrant workers do not carry the proper license and most migrant workers do
not possess the required passbooks (Srivastava and Sasikumar 2003; Srivastava 2012).
We expect the lack of portability of PDS benefits and cards to contribute to the
inertia of the unskilled who are likely to be most dependent on it. In Figure 4a, we
plot the partial regression of the share of in-state unskilled emigration on participation in the PDS. The dependent variable (on the y-axis) is the number of unskilled
emigrants who moved to destinations within the state of their origin, divided by the
total number of unskilled migrants from the said state. This measure comes from
the bilateral migration data in the 2001 Census, aggregated to the state level. The
explanatory variable (on the x-axis) is the share of the unskilled population participating in the Public Distribution System (PDS).20 The regression controls for the log
average household income per capita and the share of agricultural households at the
state level, both of which are also calculated from the NSS data. We find a positive
and significant relationship between the two variables, i.e. the larger the share of unskilled population who rely on PDS, the higher the tendency for potential emigrants
to choose home-state destinations over out-of-state destinations. This finding is con20

We calculate this measure from the consumption module of the 55th round of National Sample
Survey (1999-2000). The unskilled population refers to all members from households with a male
household head who has completed primary education or below. Any household that reported a
positive amount of PDS purchase is considered participating in the PDS, and consequently, so are
all individuals from such households.
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sistent with, and preliminary evidence for, the argument that inadequate portability
of social welfare programs such as PDS tends to deter households who rely on these
benefits from moving across state borders.

5.2

State government employment policies

The state domicile requirements for employment in government entities could act as
a disincentive to move across states. Under India’s policy of affirmative action, a
sizable proportion of jobs in central and state government entities are reserved for
individuals belonging to disadvantaged minority groups, principally the “Scheduled
Castes” (SCs) and “Scheduled Tribes” (STs). According to the Constitution of India,
the percentage of employment quota for SCs and STs in state government jobs must
be equal to their respective shares of a state’s total population. In 1999, on average
25 percent of employment in state-level government jobs was reserved for SCs and
STs (Howard and Prakash 2012). In order to be eligible for the SC/ST employment
quota in a particular state, an individual has to belong to an SC/ST community and
be domiciled in that state. Thus, individuals belonging to an SC/ST group would
lose access to reserved government jobs in their home state if they were to migrate to
another state.
This disincentive for inter-state migration is likely to matter the most for highly
educated individuals belonging to SC/ST communities but is reportedly also relevant
for non-SC/ST individuals. While the public sector accounts for only about 5 percent
of total employment in India, it is a major employer for educated individuals. On
average, 51 percent of wage-earning individuals with secondary education and above in
2000 were employed in government jobs (Schundeln and Playforth 2014). Moreover,
the majority of government jobs are with state government entities. In 2001, 76
percent of government jobs in the median state were with the state government. Taken
together, these numbers suggests that, on average, state government jobs account for
more than 25 percent of employment among individuals with secondary education and
above. Thus, educated individuals, especially but not only SC and ST individuals,
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would care about remaining eligible for the employment opportunities in their home
state government.
While all states reserve some government jobs for resident SC/STs and are reported to de facto prefer residents of that state, some states even have explicit “jobs
for natives” policies that cut across communities. For example, the state of Karnataka announced a policy in 2016 under which both private and public sector firms
would have to reserve 70 percent of their jobs for state residents to be eligible for
any state government industrial policy benefits. Orissa, Maharashtra and Himachal
Pradesh have similar quotas for state residents in factory jobs.21 To our knowledge,
there is no systematic quantitative evidence on the extent, enforcement and impact of
such policies. Potentially, such policies can create yet another disincentive to migrate
across state boundaries.
In Figure 4b, we plot the partial regression of in-state skilled emigration on public sector employment at the state level. The dependent variable (on the y-axis) is
number of high-skilled (i.e. those who completed at least secondary education) emigrants who moved to destinations within the state of their origin, divided by the
total number of high-skilled migrants from that state. The explanatory variable on
the x-axis is the share of high-skilled workers who are employed by the public sector.
This variable comes from the employment module of the National Sample Survey
(1999-2000). Log average household income per capita is also calculated from the
NSS data, and controlled for in the regression. The positive relationship shown in
the graph suggests that the higher the share of government job opportunities for the
high-skilled, the stronger the incentive for potential migrants to stay in their home
states. The argument that state domicile requirements for public sector employment
inhibit high-skilled workers from moving across state borders is novel and requires
more careful analysis.
21

See newspaper article published in the Economic Times: “Karnataka’s 70% jobs quota for locals
faces criticism; Phenomenon not limited to the state”. November 9, 2014 Edition.
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5.3

State government policies for access to higher education

Many universities and technical institutes in India are public and under the control
of the government of the state in which they are located. For example, in 2003-04,
state-level engineering and “polytechnic” colleges in the state of Tamil Nadu (TN)
had a total entering class size of about 120,000 students (Government of Tamil Nadu,
2004). State residents get preferential access to state-level colleges and institutes of
higher education through “state quota seats”. The size of the state quota varies by
state and by whether the university in question is public or private, but in general,
it is a substantial proportion of the total class size.

22

“Domicile certificates” are proofs of residence in a state that are issued by state
governments and are necessary to be eligible for the state quota in educational institutes. The certificate is issued upon proof of continuous residence in the state. The
duration of continuous residence that qualifies an individual for this certificate varies
from 3 to 10 years, depending on the state. For example, the state of Rajasthan issues
domicile certificates to individuals who have resided continuously in the state for at
least 10 years, while the state of Uttar Pradesh (UP) requires continuous residence
for at least 3 years (Government of India, 2016).
Domicile requirements for state quota eligibility provide clear and strong disincentives for inter-state migration. For example, a 16 year old who was born and
attended high school in TN would lose eligibility for state quota seats in state-level
universities in Tamil Nadu if his family were to move to another state, say Uttar
Pradesh. Moreover, because of the three-year wait period for domicile certification
in Uttar Pradesh, he would not be eligible for quota seats in state-level universities
there for at least three years.
In Figure 4c, we examine the effect of state government policies determining ac22

For example, in 2004, 50 percent of the seats in all state-level engineering colleges and medical
colleges in Tamil Nadu were under the state quota (Government of Tamil Nadu, 2005). In the
state of Maharashtra, the current state quota in state-level medical colleges varies from 70 percent
to as high as 100 percent (Government of Maharashtra, 2015). In the state of Madhya Pradesh,
38 percent of seats in private medical and dental institutes are in the state quota (Government of
Madhya Pradesh, 2014).
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cess to higher education on emigration for the purpose of education. The dependent
variable (on the y-axes) is the share of the migrants who chose home-state destinations among all migrants who moved for education related reasons. This variable
is constructed from the bilateral data from the 2001 Census as discussed earlier.
The explanatory variable on the x-axis comes from the employment module of the
National Sample Survey (1999-2000). It measures the share of college attending students among all 18-22 year old state-natives in each state. Log average household
income per capita is also calculated from the NSS data, and controlled for in the
regression. The positive slope in the graph is consistent with the argument that state
government policies granting preferential access to higher education to in-state students tend to induce potential migrants moving for education to choose home-state
institutions.

6

Conclusion

That international borders limit migration is obvious. More surprising is the role
of provincial or state borders in inhibiting mobility within a country. We are able
to demonstrate the existence of these “invisible walls” by putting together, with
the help of the Indian census authorities, detailed district-to-district migration data
from the 2001 Census. Even after controlling for key bilateral barriers to mobility,
such as physical distance and linguistic differences, and for origin and destination
specific factors through district fixed effects, we find that average migration between
neighboring districts in the same state is at least 50 percent larger than between
neighboring districts on different sides of a state border. This gap varies by education
level, age and the reason for migration, but is always large and significant. The
evidence from the recent creation of three new states in 2000 provides additional
evidence that these state borders are not natural barriers.
There are no barriers at state borders or explicit legal restrictions on people’s
mobility between states in India, and we control for distance and difference in language. Then the question is what other reasons can explain the presence of these
28

invisible walls. We argue that interstate mobility is inhibited by the existence of
state level entitlement schemes. The non-portability across state borders of social
welfare benefits, such as access to subsidized food or issuance of PDS ration cards,
weakens the incentive to move for the poor and the unskilled. People are deterred
from seeking education in other states because state residents get preferential access
in the numerous universities and technical institutes that are under state government
control. Finally, the skilled are reluctant to move to other states to seek employment
because state governments are still major employers and grant de facto preferences to
their own residents. We provide preliminary evidence that that the relative share of
migrants moving out-of-state is linked to the importance of these entitlement schemes
in each state.
This research can be taken forward in at least three ways. First, the data can
be updated when the Census Bureau releases the data for 2011 and enriched in several ways. The data tables that were made available to us are two dimensional, for
example, we can observe either the skill composition or the motive for migration in
bilateral flows between districts but not both dimensions simultaneously. Multidimensional data would facilitate richer analysis of the determinants and consequences
of internal migration in India. Second, our analysis of the reasons why state borders
restrict mobility is both selective and preliminary at this stage. A fuller analysis
would examine the role of other factors, e.g. such as the National Rural Employment
Guarantee scheme, and for finer evidence of their relative impact. Finally, we motivate this study by noting that labor mobility enables the reallocation of labor to more
productive opportunities across sectors and regions and hence promotes growth. Future analysis should assess how far India’s “fragmented entitlements” – i.e. state-level
administration of welfare benefits, as well as education and employment preferences –
dampen growth by preventing the efficient allocation of labor. It may also be possible
to assess the impact of the implementation of a unique national identification system
which will lower but not eliminate the costs of moving.
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Figure 1: Share of inter-district in-migrants in population at destination districts (%)

(a) Male

(b) Female

Figure 2: Share of inter-state in-migrants in inter-district in-migrants at destination
districts (%)

(a) Male

(b) Female

Source: Prepared by the authors based on migration data from 2001 census provided by Registrar
General and Census Commissioner, Government of India. Base map is provided by the World Bank.
Notes: Figures 1(a) and 1(b) plot each district’s share of inter-district in-migrants out of total
observed population in 2001. Figures 2(a) and 2(b) plot each district’s share of inter-state inmigrants among observed inter-district in-migrants in 2001. Each polygon represents a district, and
state borders are outlined in thick lines.
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Figure 3: Nagpur, Maharashtra

(a) Origins of in-migrants in Nagpur

(b) Origins of in-migrants (zoomed in)

(c) Destinations of out-migrants in Nagpur

(d) Destinations of out-migrants (zoomed in)

Source: Prepared by the authors based on migration data from 2001 census provided by Registrar
General and Census Commissioner, Government of India. Base map is provided by the World Bank.
Notes: In this figure, we focus on Nagpur (in the state of Maharashtra) as a destination district in
(a) and (b) and an origin district in (c) and (d). Nagpur is highlighted in red in the middle of the
maps, and all other districts are in ascending shades of blue depending on the share of migrants
they send to Nagpur or receive from Nagpur. In (a) and (b), we plot the origin districts of migrants
coming to Nagpur; in (c) and (d), we plot the destination districts of migrants from Nagpur.
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Figure 4: Institutional Barriers and Migration Inertia
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(a) Public Distribution System
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Partial Regression Coef.= 0.804, SE = 0.408, t = 1.97
Control variable: Log average household income per capita
Sample from NSS: wage earning males with secondary education or above
Sample from Census: migrants with secondary education or above
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Tertiary School Attendence and Out−migration for Education Purpose
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(b) Public employment of the high-skilled
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Partial Regression Coef.= 1.210, SE = 0.516, t = 2.34
Control variable: Log average household income per capita
Sample from NSS: in−state native males 18−22 years of age
Sample from Census: migrants who moved for the reason of education

(c) Tertiary education enrollment
Source: Prepared by the authors based on migration data from 2001 census and 1999-2000 National
Sample Survey (NSS 55th round).
Notes: This figure plots partial regression results of the effect of different entitlement policies (e.g.,
participation in PDS, share of public employment among the high-skilled, and share of tertiary
enrollment among 18-22.) on out-migration shares at the state level.
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37

825,544

169,077

1,028,610

Within PUMA

Within Prefecture

51,589
30.51

Within Municipality

36,482
3.55

Within District

16,062
10.40

Within State; Across PUMAs

43,518
5.27

Within Province; Across Prefectures

9,211
5.45

Within State; Across Municipalities

18,126
1.76

Within State, Across Districts

15,283
9.90

Across States

38,364
4.65

Across Provinces

6,057
3.58

Across States

10,870
1.06

Across States

31,345
20.30

Total Cross PUMA

81,882
9.92

Total Cross Prefecture

15,268
9.03

Total Cross Municipality

28,996
2.82

Total Cross District

a

We count District of Columbia as a state level entity.

Source: Prepared by the authors based on migration data from 2001 Indian census (provided by Registrar General and Census Commissioner,
Government of India), 2000 Brazilian census, 2000 Chinese census, and 2000 American Community Survey.
Notes: This table lists the five-year internal migration in India, Brazil, China, and the United States. First column reports the total population
count, and the ensuing columns reports internal mobility at different administrative boundaries. Second Column reports mobility within secondary
administrative units – district (India), municipality (Brazil), prefecture (China), or PUMA (Public Use Microdata Areas in the U.S); third column
reports mobility across secondary unites but within first administrative units – states (India, Brazil, U.S.) , or provinces (China); fourth column
reports mobility across first administrative units within each country.

United States: 1024 PUMAs; 51 statesa
Population (*16-64 yo; thousands)
154,435
Last 5 years migrant flow (thousands)
Last 5 years migration rate (%)

China: 340 prefecture; 31 provinces
Population (*16-65 yo; thousands)
Last 5 years migrant flow (thousands)
Last 5 years migration rate (%)

Brazil: 2376 municipalities; 27 states
Population (thousands)
Last 5 years migrant flow (thousands)
Last 5 years migration rate (%)

India: 585 districts; 35 states
Population (thousands)
Last 5 years migrant flow (thousands)
Last 5 years migration rate (%)

Table 1: Internal migration flows in 2001 (or 2000)
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FEMALE
Native
IntraIntra-stateInter(non- district inter-district
state
migrant) migrant
migrant migrant
Total
281,735
146,255
48,639
19,825 496,454
56.7
29.5
9.8
4.0
100.0

N
814
323,906
2,344
14,576
341,640

Distance
log distance (km)
4.41
6.91
4.30
5.54
6.83

Notes: This table reports the mean values of linguistic proximity and physical distance between district pairs by contiguity and border. First column
reports the number of district pairs that fall into each contiguity/border group. With 585 districts in the 2001 census, there are in total 341,640
(= 585 ∗ 584) pairs of origin and destination districts. We use two measures for linguistic proximity: Share of common language and Language overlap.
See Section 3.2 for details. Physical distance is measured as the geodesic distance between the geographic centers of two districts.

CONTIGUITY and BORDER
Different states; Neighbor
Different states; Non neighbor
Same state; Neighbor
Same state; Non neighbor
Total

Language
Share of common language Language overlap
0.40
0.50
0.16
0.19
0.70
0.83
0.70
0.79
0.18
0.22

Table 3: Bilateral migration costs between origin and destination by border and contiguity

Source: Prepared by the authors based on migration data from 2001 census provided by Registrar General and Census Commissioner, Government
of India.
Notes: This table describes the population distribution of India by gender and resident type in 2001. First row reports the total count, and the second
row reports the share of a group in total population. “Native (non-migrant)” refers to those who didn’t move; “Intra-district migrant” to one who
moved within the district; “Intra-state-inter-district migrant” to those who moved to a different district within the state; and “Inter-state migrant”
to those who moved to a different state. Our sample excludes those who reported last usual residence as “unknown”.

Resident Type
Total # (thousand)
Share (%) in population

MALE
Native
IntraIntra-stateInter(non- district inter-district
state
migrant) migrant
migrant migrant
Total
445,373
47,338
22,468
16,978 532,157
83.7
8.9
4.2
3.2
100.0

Table 2: Population distribution by gender and resident type
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FEMALE
Native
IntraIntra-stateInter(non- district inter-district
state
migrant) migrant
migrant migrant
Total
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%) (thousand)
89.6
7.0
2.2
1.2
163,348
76.8
15.9
5.2
2.1
57,051
42.0
39.4
13.4
5.2
43,443
30.9
46.3
16.2
6.6
78,777
29.7
47.3
16.3
6.6
60,395
30.8
47.4
15.6
6.2
39,277
32.2
48.2
14.4
5.3
28,001
35.9
45.4
13.7
5.0
24,924
68.6
21.9
7.2
2.4
1,238
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%) (thousand)
54.2
33.6
8.7
3.5
272,299
63.8
24.6
8.5
3.1
135,560
54.9
25.3
14.1
5.7
76,428
47.2
18.3
21.7
12.8
12,137
100.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
30
(%)
(%)
(%) (thousand)
43.8
34.6
21.6
3,902
71.2
21.5
7.3
151,656
48.5
31.5
20.0
29,402
54.9
32.8
12.4
939
75.5
17.6
6.9
28,819
(%)
(%)
(%) (thousand)
53.4
29.3
17.3
4,579
62.4
25.8
11.7
37,599
64.6
24.9
10.5
31,508
69.5
22.1
8.4
120,360
78.9
15.3
5.8
20,674

Source: Prepared by the authors based on migration data from 2001 census provided by Registrar General and Census Commissioner, Government
of India.
Notes: This table describes the demographic distribution of 2001 India population by gender, resident type, and demographic groups including age,
education level, reason for migration, or duration of migration. Definitions of 4 types of residents are introduced in Table 2. Education level is
the highest degree that an individual has completed. “Secondary” includes Lower Secondary, High Secondary (or Senior Secondary) degrees, and
vocational/professional diplomas. “College +” includes undergraduate degrees and above. Row percentages are reported, as well as total counts of
migrants for each demographic group.

Resident Type
AGE GROUP
0-13
14-19
20-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65+
Age not stated
EDUCATION LEVEL
Illiterate
Primary
Secondary
College +
Education level unknown
REASON FOR MIGRATION
Work or business
Marriage
Move with family
Education
Other reason
DURATION OF MIGRATION
0-1 years
1-5 years
6-10 years
10 + years
Duration unknown

MALE
Native
IntraIntra-stateInter(non- district inter-district
state
migrant) migrant
migrant migrant
Total
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%) (thousand)
89.6
6.9
2.3
1.2
177,675
85.7
8.4
3.4
2.5
65,753
82.5
8.5
4.5
4.4
46,321
80.0
9.7
5.4
4.9
78,919
77.7
11.2
6.3
4.9
65,917
77.1
11.5
6.6
4.8
44,719
79.7
10.6
5.7
4.0
27,169
82.2
9.9
4.8
3.2
24,182
85.1
9.1
3.8
2.0
1,501
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%) (thousand)
88.5
7.1
2.3
2.1
195,623
85.2
8.9
3.4
2.5
176,035
78.4
10.7
6.3
4.7
134,898
64.4
13.5
13.7
8.4
25,533
100.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
68
(%)
(%)
(%) (thousand)
30.1
34.0
35.9
26,867
70.6
22.0
7.4
2,125
53.9
29.6
16.5
25,590
49.7
34.9
15.4
2,266
76.3
15.0
8.7
29,935
(%)
(%)
(%) (thousand)
43.0
31.2
25.8
3,976
45.8
30.2
24.0
19,324
43.8
31.5
24.7
12,176
44.3
31.4
24.3
29,050
83.4
11.0
5.6
22,258

Table 4: Demographic distribution of population by gender, resident type, and age/education/reason/duration
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0.01

0.25
341,640

0.26
341,640

0.26
341,640

0.43
341,640

0

(0.129)***

0.968

(0.110)***

2.259

(0.138)***

1.853

(0.107)***

0.421

(0.082)***

(7)
-1.603

0.43
341,640

0

(0.091)***

0.913

(0.085)***

2.218

(0.136)***

1.849

(0.104)***

0.690

(0.092)***

Females
(8)
-1.590

0.43
341,640

0.98
0

(0.095)***

0.662

(0.142)***

2.314

(0.089)***

0.996

(0.085)***

2.317

(0.143)***

1.879

(0.107)***

0.591

(0.092)***

(9)
-1.579

Notes:Huber-White robust standard errors (clustered by origin district) are reported in parentheses. All specifications include origin fixed effect
and destination fixed effect. The sample includes 341,640 observations, which accounts for bilateral migration stock between 585 origin and 584
destination districts in 2001. Dependent variable is the bilateral migration stock, mij , of all inter-district migrants in (1)-(3), of inter-district male
migrants in (4)-(6), and of inter-district female migrants in (7)-(9). See definition and construction of distance and language measures in text. All
district pairs fall into six mutually exclusive categories regarding contiguity ({Neighbors; not neighbors}) and state borders ({Different states; Split
states; Same state}). We include five dummy variables in the estimation to indicate the dyadic relationship of district pairs regarding contiguity and
state borders. For example, “Different states, neighbors” takes the value 1 when the sending and receiving districts are from different districts and
share a common border; 0 otherwise. Districts from split states are labeled as from “Different states” except in columns (3), (6) and (9). p-values
from t-tests comparing border coefficients are reported under coefficients.

* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

0.32 0.32
341,640
341,640

0.32
341,640

0

0.16
0

(0.089)***

(0.086)***

0.58
0

0.988

0.793

(0.141)***

(0.088)***

1.316

(0.073)***

1.848

(0.161)***

1.356

(0.147)***

(0.092)***

1.198

(0.074)***

1.703

(0.156)***

1.305

(0.180)***

0.621

(0.117)***

(6)
-1.396

2.044

(0.156)***

1.294

(0.089)***

1.780

(0.154)***

1.300

(0.173)***

0.758

(0.116)***

Males
(5)
-1.412

2.306

(0.092)***

R2
N

(0.095)***

(0.144)***

1.126

(0.077)***

2.242

(0.155)***

0

1.029

(0.107)***

1.097

2.125
(0.078)***

2.177

(0.149)***

(0.149)***

1.765

(0.114)***

1.729

(0.107)***

1.730

0.405

(0.101)***

(4)
-1.436

0.391

0.575

(0.104)***
(0.132)***

(0.091)***

(3)
-1.479

(0.128)***

(0.104)***

(1)
-1.510
0.690

All
(2)
-1.492

p-value: Same.nbr = Split.nbr
p-value: Same.nbr = Diff.nbr 0

Split states, not neighbors

Split states, neighbors

Same state; not neighbors

Same state; neighbors

Different states, neighbors

Language Overlap

Share of Common Language

log Distance

Sample

Table 5: PPML gravity estimation on district-to-district migration by gender, 2001
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0.30
341,640

R2
N

0.36
341,640

0.21

(0.102)***

0.957

(0.078)***

1.430

(0.157)***

1.234

(0.171)***

0.873

(0.128)***

65 +
-1.507

0.48
341,640

0

(0.084)***

0.907

(0.086)***

2.282

(0.137)***

1.897

(0.100)***

0.679

(0.087)***

25-34
-1.590

0.49
341,640

0

(0.090)***

0.839

(0.088)***

2.163

(0.136)***

1.812

(0.106)***

0.665

(0.092)***

Females
35-64
-1.643

0.58
341,640

0

(0.092)***

0.777

(0.096)***

2.205

(0.130)***

1.891

(0.119)***

0.675

(0.091)***

65+
-1.722

Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors (clustered by origin district) are reported in parentheses. All specifications include origin fixed effect and
destination fixed effect. The sample includes 341,640 observations, which accounts for bilateral migration stock between 585 origin and 584 destination
districts in 2001. Dependent variable is the bilateral migration stock, mij , of inter-district male migrants by age group, and of inter-district female
migrants by age group. See Table 4 for the age composition of males and females. Definition and construction of distance and language measures are
described in text. All district pairs fall into four mutually exclusive categories regarding contiguity ({Neighbors; not neighbors}) and state borders
({Different states; Same state}). We include three dummy variables in the estimation to indicate the dyadic relationship of district pairs regarding
contiguity and state borders. For example, “Different states, neighbors” takes the value 1 when the sending and receiving districts are from different
districts and share a common border; 0 otherwise. p-values from t-tests comparing border coefficients are reported under coefficients.

* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

0.27
341,640

0.02

1.175
(0.090)***

(0.093)***

(0.077)***

(0.083)***

1.262

1.541

(0.149)***

(0.166)***

1.683

1.161

1.295

0.700
(0.161)***

(0.191)***

(0.122)***

0.719

(0.112)***

25-34
-1.407

p-value: Same.nbr = Diff.nbr 0.03

Same state; not neighbors

Same state; neighbors

Different state, neighbors

Share of Common Language

Ages
log Distance

Males
35-64
-1.489

Table 6: PPML gravity estimation on district-to-district migration by gender and age, 2001
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0.22
341,640

0.03

(0.101)***

1.336

(0.084)***

1.717

(0.167)***

1.137

(0.183)***

0.746

1.167

0.42
341,640

0

(0.058)***

1.527

(0.096)***

1.852

(0.138)***

0.939

(0.148)***

0.66
341,640

0

(0.076)***

0.604

(0.093)***

2.359

(0.116)***

2.058

(0.108)***

0.442

(0.077)***

Illiterate
-1.710

0.38
341,640

0

(0.117)***

1.038

(0.097)***

2.188

(0.153)***

1.823

(0.115)***

0.768

(0.112)***

0.36
341,640

0

(0.062)***

1.130

(0.070)***

1.894

(0.130)***

1.320

(0.109)***

0.859

(0.084)***

0.44
341,640

0

(0.060)***

1.265

(0.097)***

1.632

(0.127)***

0.844

(0.149)***

1.184

(0.083)***

Females
Primary Secondary College +
-1.644
-1.539
-1.202

Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors (clustered by origin district) are reported in parentheses. All specifications include origin fixed effect
and destination fixed effect. The sample includes 341,640 observations, which accounts for bilateral migration stock between 585 origin and 584
destination districts in 2001. Dependent variable is the bilateral migration stock, mij , of inter-district male migrants by education attainment, and
of inter-district female migrants by education attainment. Education attainment is the highest degree that an individual has completed. “Secondary”
includes Lower Secondary, High Secondary (or Senior Secondary) degrees, and vocational/professional diplomas. “College +” includes undergraduate
degrees and above. See Table 4 for the education attainment composition of males and females. Definition and construction of distance and language
measures are described in text. All district pairs fall into four mutually exclusive categories regarding contiguity ({Neighbors; not neighbors}) and
state borders ({Different states; Same state}). We include three dummy variables in the estimation to indicate the dyadic relationship of district pairs
regarding contiguity and state borders. For example, “Different states, neighbors” takes the value 1 when the sending and receiving districts are from
different districts and share a common border; 0 otherwise. p-values from t-tests comparing border coefficients are reported under coefficients.

* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

0.25
341,640

0.40
341,640

R2
N

(0.115)***

(0.102)***

0.06

1.122

(0.084)***

0.807

1.745

(0.099)***

(0.176)***

1.482

1.451

(0.137)***

(0.192)***

(0.174)***

1.325

0.705

0.601

(0.094)***

(0.102)***

(0.120)***

(0.139)***

Illiterate
-1.653

p-value: Same.nbr = Diff.nbr 0.18

Same state; not neighbors

Same state; neighbors

Different state, neighbors

Share of Common Language

Education Level
log Distance

Males
Primary Secondary College +
-1.510
-1.388
-1.167

Table 7: PPML gravity estimation on district-to-district migration by gender and education attainment, 2001
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(0.131)***

0.30
341,640

0.01

(0.072)***

1.148

(0.077)***

1.684

(0.116)***

1.368

0.49
341,640

0

(0.084)***

1.778

(0.089)***

2.365

(0.151)***

1.031

(0.134)***

1.334

(0.089)***

Education
-1.206

0.67
341,640

0

(0.078)***

0.717

(0.095)***

2.317

(0.122)***

1.996

(0.098)***

0.587

(0.082)***

Marriage
-1.767

0.49
341,640

0.01

(0.086)***

1.049

(0.109)***

1.376

(0.139)***

1.047

(0.153)***

0.789

(0.089)***

0.32
341,640

0

(0.067)***

1.173

(0.077)***

1.668

(0.118)***

1.255

(0.123)***

0.881

(0.078)***

Females
Work or Move with
Business
Family
-1.578
-1.426

0.44
340,472

0

(0.091)***

1.806

(0.107)***

2.486

(0.147)***

0.896

(0.151)***

1.316

(0.091)***

Education
-1.222

Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors (clustered by origin district) are reported in parentheses. All specifications include origin fixed effect and
destination fixed effect. The sample includes 341,640 observations, which accounts for bilateral migration stock between 585 origin and 584 destination
districts in 2001. Dependent variable is the bilateral migration stock, mij , of inter-district by gender and reason for migration. See Table 4 for the
composition of reasons for migration. Definition and construction of distance and language measures are described in text. All district pairs fall into
four mutually exclusive categories regarding contiguity ({Neighbors; not neighbors}) and state borders ({Different states; Same state}). We include
three dummy variables in the estimation to indicate the dyadic relationship of district pairs regarding contiguity and state borders. For example,
“Different states, neighbors” takes the value 1 when the sending and receiving districts are from different districts and share a common border; 0
otherwise. p-values from t-tests comparing border coefficients are reported under coefficients.

* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

0.40
341,640

R2
N

0.82
341,640

0.01

(0.083)***

(0.066)***

(0.084)***

1.227

0.877

(0.080)***

(0.149)***

1.511

2.257

(0.111)***

(0.171)***

1.052

(0.116)***

2.145

0.939

(0.080)***

(0.105)***

0.496

(0.077)***

1.062

Marriage
-1.639

p-value: Same.nbr = Diff.nbr 0.11

Same state; not neighbors

Same state; neighbors

Different state, neighbors

Share of Common Language

Reason for Migration
log Distance

Males
Work or Move with
Business
Family
-1.48
-1.454

Table 8: PPML gravity estimation on district-to-district migration by gender and reason for migration, 2001

Table 9: District migration gravity estimation– attraction index

l.distij , geo. centroids
Share of Common Language
Different state, neighbors
Same state; neighbors
Same state; not neighbors

(1)

(2)

(3)

-1.600

-1.616

-1.611

(0.050)***

(0.051)***

(0.050)***

0.596

0.593

0.590

(0.092)***

(0.094)***

(0.093)***

1.605

1.591

2.345

(0.105)***

(0.102)***

(0.222)***

2.076

2.057

2.420

(0.068)***

(0.068)***

(0.102)***

0.930

0.927

0.906

(0.053)***

(0.053)***

(0.098)***

0.182

0.161

(0.051)***

(0.049)***

Attraction Index
Attraction Index * Different states, neighbors

-0.576
(0.157)***

Attraction Index * Same state, neighbors

-0.286
(0.072)***

Attraction Index * Different state, not neighbors

0.023
(0.067)

R2
N

0.72
329,460

0.72
329,460

0.73
329,460

* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors (clustered by origin district) are reported in parentheses.
All specifications include origin fixed effect and destination fixed effect. The sample is restricted to
district pairs with non-missing district attributes including percentage non-ST/SC in population,
literacy rate, urban population share, share of private employment, share of formal sector, and
average income. Dependent variable is the bilateral migration stock, mij , of inter-district migration
of both males and females. See text for definition of ‘Attraction Index’. Construction of other
variables follow Tables 5 - 9.

44

45
0.32
341,640

0

1.993

0.31
341,640

0

1.767

0.32
341,640

0
0.26
341,640

0.25
341,640

0.26
341,640

* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

0.29
341,640

0

0.21
341,640

.03

-1.389
(0.182)***

-1.403

(0.147)***

1.182

(0.112)***

2.004

(0.256)***

1.603

(0.193)***

1.088

(8)

(0.151)***

.02

-1.359
(0.111)***

(0.090)***

1.221

(0.078)***

-1.413

.06

1.401
(0.150)***

(0.097)***

-1.168
(0.156)***

(0.121)***

1.291

(0.104)***

-1.171

.01

1.628
(0.250)***

0.841

(7)
(0.167)***

Males

(0.209)***

0.979

(6)

(0.126)***

-1.412

(0.092)***

1.198

(0.074)***

1.703

(0.156)***

1.305

(0.173)***

0.758

(5)

(0.116)***

(0.139)***

1.092

(0.128)***

2.590

(0.221)***

2.155

(0.140)***

1.023

(4)

-1.492

(0.091)***

1.067

(0.076)***

2.235

(0.144)***

1.856

(0.123)***

0.789

(3)

(0.104)***

1.197
(0.118)***

1.029
(0.095)***

2.572
(0.118)***

2.125
(0.078)***

2.187
(0.210)***

1.729
(0.149)***

0.929
(0.150)***

All
0.690

(2)

(0.128)***

(1)

0.43
341,640

0

(0.092)***

-1.590

(0.091)***

0.913

(0.085)***

2.218

(0.136)***

1.849

(0.104)***

0.690

(9)

0.40
341,640

0

(0.106)***

-1.199

(0.109)***

1.141

(0.119)***

2.799

(0.186)***

2.419

(0.118)***

0.943

0.43
341,640

0

(0.084)***

-1.489

(0.087)***

0.965

(0.082)***

2.367

(0.133)***

2.005

(0.101)***

0.798

Females
(11)
(10)

0.40
341,640

0

(0.126)***

-1.465

(0.127)***

1.020

(0.126)***

2.793

(0.194)***

2.356

(0.112)***

1.021

(12)

Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors (clustered by origin district) are reported in parentheses. All specifications include origin fixed effect and
destination fixed effect. The sample includes 329,460 observations, which accounts for bilateral migration stock between 585 origin and 584 destination
districts in 2001. Dependent variable is the bilateral migration stock, mij , of inter-district by gender. Construction of other variables follow Tables 5
- 9. Four measures of distance are used for this robustness check. ‘l.distij , geo. centroids’ is the geodesic (flight) distance between the geographic
centers of district i and j – it is the same distance measure used in Tables 5 - 9. Alternatively, ‘l.distij , economic centers’ calculates the flight distance
between the economic centers of district i and j. ‘l.T ravelT imeij ’ takes into account India’s transport network (national highways and the GQ),
and measures the driving time on the shortest path between the economic centers of i and j. See Alder, Roberts, and Tewari (2017) for more details
on the method of computing the shortest paths. ‘l.T ravelT imeij , flat’ assumes the same driving speed on and off the roads.

R2
N

p-value: Same.nbr = Diff.nbr

l.T ravelT imeij

l.T ravelT imeij , flat

l.distij , economic centers

l.distij , geo. centroids

Same state; not neighbors

Same state; neighbors

Different state, neighbors

Share of Common Language

Sample

Table 10: District migration gravity estimation – alternative distance measures

